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The Evil of Lying and its Definition: Studies In Thomistic Realism 
 In times of social crisis, moral reasoning about lying becomes more urgent. This 
is because the desire for justification for routine lying is suddenly needed, as hostile 
governments force citizens to swear allegiance to propositions or practices that violate 
their consciences. To safeguard their profession, their religion, or even their lives, 
people seek to avoid the threatened penalties by compromising with the aggressor. 
Their desire is to maintain a good conscience and avoid harm while giving their 
conscience’s aggressor some indication of cooperation or acquiescence. Catholic moral 
theology, particularly in the Early Modern Period (1450-1700), offered reasoning about 
how to preserve the truth and one’s life in the context of Elizabethan England. In the 
contemporary United States, health care workers in particular foresee the crisis of being 
required to participate in procedures that violate their consciences or to lie about them, 
or be forced to leave their professions. It is thus timely to re-consider the Catholic moral 
tradition, and St. Thomas Aquinas’ thought on lying and the requirements of the truth.     
In the first chapter of this thesis, I will review the theologian Paul Griffith’s 
Augustinian argument in favor of the absolute prohibition on lying. His book is an 
exposition on the Augustinian heritage that most influenced the Church in her thinking 
about lying.
1
 Although Aquinas modifies Augustine’s thought on the matter in important 
ways, he concurs that lies are absolutely prohibited in the light of faith and reason. This 
historical overview ends with a consideration of the papal condemnations of strict 
mental reservations, which are a type of lie. Although this should be conclusive for 
Catholic moral theologians, it is appropriate to explore the theological and philosophical 
reasoning for an absolute prohibition on lying and strict mental reservations, which are 
contrary to the goods of faith and human nature.  
The second chapter of this thesis explores why lying is evil. This task requires an 
explanation of the relations of thought to reality, and the representation of thought in 
linguistic contexts. I argue that reality is the measure of thought, and that linguistic 
contexts, while only imposing a conventional rule, nonetheless constrain what may 
truthfully be said in definite circumstances. This analysis will implicitly suggest why lying 
is possible, namely because a speaker can refuse to be ruled by reality and by the rules 
of language in contexts.  
The third chapter of this thesis explores two types of near lies: those which 
employ strict and broad mental reservations. I will argue that these forms of speech are 
materially different and have different tendencies; they are intentionally different, 
because they either aim at untruth or do not do so, respectively. Ultimately, I will 
maintain that lying and strict mental reservations, besides being proscribed by the 
Catholic moral tradition, are also inherently opposed to the truth and reality, and so 
should be rejected on the grounds of reason as well. 
                                                          
1
 Paul J. Griffiths, Lying: An Augustinian Theology of Duplicity (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2004). 
Chapter One: Paul Griffith’s Augustinian Argument Against Lying and Early Modern 
Developments 
I. Augustine and Aquinas on Lying  
 Sts. Augustine and Aquinas are at the heart of the Christian tradition on lying, 
and they agree on an absolute prohibition on lying. They agree that lying involves 
intentionally speaking contra mentem, but differ on whether lying also involves an 
intention to deceive.
2
 Their arguments about lying’s impermissibility are slightly 
different, and have been delineated accurately in recent articles.
3
 
 Paul J. Griffiths, in his recent text, Lying: An Augustinian Theology of Duplicity, 
offers a critical retrieval of Augustine’s theological argument for the prohibition on all 
lying. Since Augustine’s treatment of lying was occasional and unsystematic, Griffiths 
assembles Augustine’s theological principles to create a systematic defense of 
Augustine’s prohibition. It is of value to assess this account, so that it may be compared 
with the Thomistic approach which follows in chapters two and three of this thesis. 
 Griffiths situates his Augustinian argument against all lying in an account of the 
pathology of the will. This description of the origin of sin is not meant to describe 
Augustine’s robust theory of original sin and its implications, but merely to expose the 
root of lying. Griffiths notes that for Augustine, sin is primarily concerned with desire 
                                                          
2
 See Boniface Ramsey, “Two Traditions on Lying and Deception in the Ancient Church,” The Thomist 49 
(1985): 504-33. Aquinas does not think that the intention to deceive is a necessary part of the definition 
(ST II-II, q. 110, a. 1, ad 3). 
3
 See Joseph Boyle, “The Absolute Prohibition of Lying and the Origins of the Casuistry of Mental 
Reservation: Augustinian Arguments and Thomistic Developments,” American Journal of Jurisprudence 44 
(1999): 43-65. And Thomas Petri, O.P. and Michael A. Wahl, “Live Action and Planned Parenthood: A New 
Test Case for Lying,” Nova et Vetera, English Edition 10 (2012): 437-62. 
and the will, and not reason.
4
 Augustine holds that pride is the beginning of sin, and is a 
rejoicing in oneself apart from God.
5
 Sin is a privation of goodness in the will, and man 
has a tendency to nothingness, because he is created ex nihilo.
6
 Augustine recalls the 
Pear Tree Incident in Confessions, Book 2, as a sin which most bore this mark. Griffiths 
writes: “the only thing that entices him is the evil of his action (he is malus gratis, evil for 
nothing, freely evil), and this is the fundamental and endlessly difficult fact about sin.”
7
  
 Aquinas’ thought about sin and its origin shares these basic patristic bases about 
the disorder of the will. But in Griffiths’ reading, Augustine has quite a different view of 
the remedy for sin. Griffiths holds that for Augustine, adoration and worship is the 
primary cure for sin.
8
 By implication, speech is then a gift given primarily for praise and 
adoration of God. Mendacium is thus the antithesis to adoratio, because it 
misappropriates words and denies their origin and orientation as gifts for God.
9
 
 Griffiths contends that though Aquinas is in accord with Augustine on the ban on 
lying, Augustine’s position is more radical in certain respects. First, Griffiths says that 
Augustine’s ban on lying is total, while Aquinas seems to permit lying to save the 
innocent.
10
 Similarly, he notes that Aquinas seems to permit dissimulation, while 
                                                          
4
 Paul J. Griffiths, 56. 
5
 Ibid., 59. 
6
 Ibid., 61. 
7
 Ibid., 68. 
8
 Ibid., 64. 
9
 Ibid., 85. 
10
 Ibid., 230. Lawrence Dewan, O.P., concurs, maintaining that lying to protect an innocent is a venial sin 
for Thomas Aquinas, and that one is not bound to avoid all venial sins: “St. Thomas, Lying, and Venial Sin,” 
The Thomist 61 (1997): 279-99. But this interpretation implies that Aquinas taught that one can directly 
intend to commit a venial sin with impunity, which is not supported by any text from Aquinas. 
Augustine rejects it.
11
 Griffiths observes that Aquinas treats the problem of lying in a 
section of the Secunda Secundae of the Summa Theologiae concerned with justice, 
while Augustine treats it as a separate topic in two essays. He then criticizes Aquinas for 
what he takes to be an inconsistency in treating lying as a “secundum se” evil.
12
 He 
writes: 
 If the lie-as-such is sinful, the sense in which and the extent to which it is sinful 
 will remain the same for all lies. To say that a particular lie’s mortality or veniality 
 depends upon its topic is to say that no lie is intrinsically mortal—for if it were, 
 no change of topic could make it cease to be so.
13
 
 
II. A Response to Griffiths 
 Although Griffith’s Augustinian defense of the ban on lying is impressive in some 
respects, his reading of Aquinas needs correction. First, Griffiths assumes that Aquinas 
teaches that venial lies are permissible. But though Lawrence Dewan argues this, there 
is no text in Aquinas that says that venial lies or sins are simply permitted, and he 
maintains that all lies are sins. Second, Aquinas accepts the distinction of the three types 
of lies, i.e., malicious, officious, and jocose, from Augustine. It is difficult to see how 
these lies are distinguished morally on any other basis than gravity of evil, as Aquinas 
distinguishes them. And it is unclear why Augustine would distinguish the types of lies if 
they were all of the same gravity of evil. 
 Griffiths appears to be conflating per se evils with mortal sins. And while 
typically, one can distinguish intrinsically evil acts from an agent’s intention by pointing 
                                                          
11
 Paul J. Griffiths, 179. 
12
 Ibid., 180. 
13
 Ibid. 
to unintended evil acts, it seems as though a lie cannot be separated from an intention 
to lie. That is, both Augustine and Aquinas take a lie to be deliberately speaking contra 
mentem, and not merely speaking falsely, since one may inadvertently speak falsely, 
believing it to be true.  But though a lie is an intentional commission of a per se evil, it 
does not necessarily follow that all are equally mortal sins, because a mortal sin requires 
more than a mere intention to commit an intrinsic evil.
14
 Ignorance and coercion are 
obvious factors that may prevent such a sin from being mortal. And we will see in 
chapter three how intentions distinguish the type and gravity of lies. 
 Second, Griffiths’ Augustinian defense depreciates natural reason. That is, his 
notion that language is primarily for adoratio seems to neglect its use for the simple 
communication of truth in ordinary affairs. He reflects on lying in light of the Holy Trinity 
and the Incarnation, but as dogmas of faith, these references do not help one see why 
lying is known to be evil by natural reason. In addition, Griffiths maintains that avoiding 
lying requires grace and regular worship.
15
 And though perfect consistency in avoiding 
lying may require grace, it seems to exaggerate the need for grace by only giving 
reasons against lying from revelation.  
I will show in the next chapter that Aquinas offers an argument against lying that 
is more judicious to reason than Griffiths’. And while Griffiths does well to seek to 
reclaim Augustinian terms on the problem of lying, it is essential at this historical 
juncture also to reclaim Thomistic terms and methods, as Jacques Maritain did in the 
                                                          
14
 “For a sin to be mortal, three conditions must together be met: ‘Mortal sin is sin whose object is grave 
matter and which is also committed with full knowledge and deliberate consent’” (CCC 1857).  
15
 Paul J. Griffiths, 225. 
last century. But before this, it is important to relate the critical historical context in 
which these Thomistic terms were further refined and received ecclesiastical sanction or 
reprobation, depending on the case. This critical historical context is the rise of 
casuistry, which will particularly inform the third chapter of this thesis—on mental 
reservations. 
III. Early Modern Developments on Lying and the Papal Condemnations 
 Although Augustine and Aquinas concur on the absolution prohibition on lying, 
the Catholic theological tradition has developed its understanding of the problem 
through the history of persecution in the sixteenth century and the development of 
casuistry.
16
 In their historical work, The Abuse of Casuistry, Albert R. Jonsen and Stephen 
Toulmin show that moral reasoning about lying developed considerably in the early 
modern period, and centered around the problem of a priest’s defense of the seal of 
confession.
17
 
 Although the Medieval Summists were partial and scattered in their treatments 
of the lying problem, Dominico Soto gave an influential set of lectures on the topic in 
1552. Soto said that equivocation and ambiguity outside the law may certainly be 
employed in the case of a priest asked about a confession.  There the priest may say, “I 
do not know,” with the “unexpressed qualification, ‘in a way I can state publicly.’” But 
                                                          
16
 Joseph Boyle notes that Raymond of Penafort initiated the tradition of casuistry on lying, while dealing 
with the case of Abraham’s deception about Sarah, in “The Absolute Prohibition of Lying and the Origins 
of the Casuistry of Mental Reservation: Augustinian Arguments and Thomistic Developments,” 63.  
17
 Albert R. Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1988), 199. 
he held that one cannot employ “more elaborate forms of restriction.”
18
  He affirms that 
death is better than using an illegitimate equivocation. He and his contemporaries had 
in mind Augustine’s view “that human speech was always to be understood as spoken 
before God.”
19
 The canonist Navarrus makes an argument that though the hearer does 
not understand the utterance with its intended meaning, God does.  Thus God does not 
judge it a lie, though it deceives the hearer. 
 This was the beginning of the defense of mental reservations/restrictions.  This 
practice was considered an option for priests when asked about confession, but not 
generally.  The Jesuit Juan Azor said that one could only employ a mental reservation in 
the priest case, or when one is responding to an unjust judge.
20
  If no injustice is 
presented, one could not prevaricate in this way.   
 Later casuists tend to approve of equivocation, where a term with multiple 
senses can be used with the expectation that it will be interpreted wrongly. But its 
permissibility depended on the duties of the questioner (e.g. lawful judge) or 
questioned (e.g. priest).
21
 Mental restrictions depended less on linguistic usage and 
more on the qualifications in the speaker’s mind.  Soto seemed to excuse broad 
restrictions.  The problem with broad restrictions is that they tend not to succeed in 
                                                          
18
 Ibid., 200. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Ibid., 201. 
21
 Ibid., 202. 
misleading.
22
 The question of strict restrictions came to the fore in the English 
persecution. 
 The Jesuit Henry Garnet published a pamphlet in 1595 that argued that it was 
permissible to deny that a priest was in the “house” by means of a mental reservation, 
e.g., the neighbor’s “house,” as long as God understood the strict restriction in mind.
23
 
Garnet distinguishes this type of equivocation, i.e., on “house” from strict reservation, 
or deceptive prevarication. Garnet excuses the second type with the confessional 
example, but applies it generally.  The Jesuits Paul Laymann and John De Lugo call this a 
simple lie.
24
  Garnet’s argument depends on the questioners being unjust and asking 
wicked questions.  So his endorsement of strict reservation is not terribly lax.  His notion 
is that the question or oath is an unjust one to impose on the hearer. Answering the 
oath on its own terms would be an injustice, he argues.  Being silent would seem to 
assent.  So, one may only deny.
25
  Robert Persons, his companion, agreed that 
equivocation was licit.  But Persons said one could not equivocate on the Oath of 
Allegiance because it explicitly had one swear not to equivocate. 
 Over a period of about thirty years, the Navarrus/Garnet argument for mental 
reservations became quite influential. The Englishman Robert Sanderson said a royalist 
cannot simply take an anti-royalist oath without sinning. But if one interprets the oath 
                                                          
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Ibid., 208. 
24
 Ibid., 209. 
25
 Ibid., 210. 
not to be anti-royalist by equivocating on its language, then one can take it.
26
 Thirty 
years after the Navarrus/Garnet interpretation was developed, the Jesuits repudiated it, 
while still holding that an unjust judge has no claim to one’s truth.
27
  
So the accepted practice moved from Augustine’s rigorous position to broad 
reservation/equivocation for priests. Augustine did not relax the prohibition on lying 
based on the authority or rights of the speaker or interrogator. But the Jesuits offered 
cases where the prohibition could have exceptions, at least allowing priests to use broad 
reservations or equivocation. But this was an unstable conclusion, since broad 
reservations/equivocations were easily seen through. So the desire for greater laxity on 
mental reservations grew. However, the paradigm case remained that of a priest, who 
shared the truth only with God, and an unjust questioner.
28
 
 Hostile legal proceedings in England kept the doctrine of mental reservations on 
firm ground.  But using mental restrictions in inquiries between private parties led it to 
fall apart.
29
  The Holy Office condemned three casuist positions on lying in 1679, on 
strict reservation, regular equivocations for earthly possessions, and taking oaths with 
mental restrictions.
30
  These were drawn from the writing of the Jesuit canonists 
Sanchez and Lessius.  
                                                          
26
 Ibid., 212. 
27
 Ibid., 211. 
28
 Ibid., 213. 
29
 Ibid., 214. 
30
 Pope Innocent XI, Condemnation of Laxist Doctrine (1679), DS #1176-1178, in The Abuse of Casuistry, 
Jonsen and Toulmin, 384. 
The first condemnation, against strict mental reservations, is against swearing 
that one did not do something that one did, understanding within himself something 
else which he did not do, or with some added truth.
31
 The second condemnation is 
against the justification of lying in order to protect some earthly good, including the 
body.
32
 The third condemnation is of mental reservations when taking oaths. 
Apparently, the justification for strict mental reservations in this case is that the one 
requiring the oath has no right to the truth.
33
 In sum, these papal condemnations 
explicitly rule out strict mental reservations and proscribe lies justified by claims to 
protect one’s life and to ward off unjust aggressors. Contemporary Catholic moralists 
tend not to advert to these official church teachings. 
These condemnations brought the Church back to Soto’s position: rare 
equivocations and broad reservations when one needed to answer. The strict 
reservations controversy did lasting damage to the reputation of theological casuistry 
and of the Jesuits.  
 This historical excursus is important, because theologians and philosophers tend 
to treat the problem of mental reservations apart from this history and the official 
                                                          
31
 Enchiridion Symbolorum, ed. Henricus Denzinger and Adolfus Schonmetzer (Barcelona: Herder, 1963), 
#1176: “Si quis [iuret]. . .se non fecisse aliquid, quod revera fecit, intelligendo intra se aliquid aliud, quod 
non fecit. . .vel quodvis alius additum verum. . .” 
32
 Ibid., #1177: “Causa iusta utendi his amphibologiies est, quoties id necessarium aut utile est ad salutem 
corporis, honorem. . ..” 
33
 Ibid., #1178: “Qui mediante commendatione vel munere ad magistratum vel officium publicum 
promotus est, poterit cum restrictione mentali praestare iuramentum, quod de mandato regis a similibus 
solet exigi, non habito respectu ad intentionem exigentis. . ..” 
Church teaching on the matter.
34
 As a tradition, Catholic moral thought does not 
approach perennial problems like lying apart from their historical antecedents. In light 
of this history and Church doctrine, I will offer a defense of broad mental reservations in 
the third chapter, which can be defined as a speech act where the meaning of the 
speaker’s words are broadly connected with his intended sense, so that the true sense 
can be known. At the same time, I will argue against the permissibility of strict mental 
reservations, which are speech acts whose meaning is strictly reserved to the speaker, 
making the hearer’s ability to interpret the statement correctly nearly impossible. 
Chapter Two: The Evil of Lying for Aquinas 
In his Commentary on the Gospel of John, William of Alton, a Dominican 
contemporary of Thomas Aquinas, provides an intriguing interpretation of the 
“unforgiveable sin” of Matthew 12:31.
35
 This is usually interpreted as a sin which 
fundamentally reject’s God’s mercy. But Alton gives another example of the 
unforgiveable sin in Pilate’s question, “What is truth?” of John 18:38. Alton points out 
that the question is asked in the presence of the One who is Truth. Hence, Pilate’s 
question represents a rank and complete denial of the truth itself. 
This type of rejection of the truth is familiar to one who has shown another that 
his position is absurd or contradictory, and yet he still maintains it. Though it may be 
                                                          
34
 See Janet Smith, “Fig Leaves and Falsehoods,” First Things 214 (June-July, 2011): 45-49. And Christopher 
Kaczor, “In Defense of Live Action,“ Public Discourse (February 11, 2011), accessed April 7, 2013, 
www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2011/02/2538. Hadley Arkes, “When Speaking Falsely is Right,”Public 
Discourse (February 19, 2011), accessed April 7, 2013, 
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2011/02/2631/. 
35
 My thanks to Rev. Timothy Bellamah, O.P., for providing this reference from an unpublished 
manuscript. 
forgivable, the ultimacy of this rejection is significant. Such a complete rejection would 
be apt to make a teacher despair of his task, if it were not fairly common. For the 
rejection indicates an unwillingness to learn, and a refusal to grow in truth and 
goodness. It is also the antithesis of wonder at reality. The intersection of the good, the 
true, and reality is a touchstone of St. Thomas’s thought. Sin and evil are the 
consequences of departure from the transcendentals and the order established by 
God.
36
 Through reference to Jacques Maritain’s St. Thomas and the Problem of Evil, I will 
briefly treat St. Thomas’s thought on the metaphysical origin of ethics and the problem 
of evil, and show how these doctrines contribute to the understanding of why lying is 
understood to be a per se evil.  
I. First moment of evil 
In St. Thomas and the Problem of Evil, Maritain elaborates on an important, but 
relatively undeveloped doctrine of Aquinas on the origin of moral evil. In this doctrine, 
Aquinas makes an important advance on Augustine’s thought on the problem. In On 
Free Choice of the Will, Augustine raises the problem that God would seem to be the 
cause of sins, since God created the souls from which they come.
37
 Augustine locates 
the cause of moral evil solely in the human will. His notion that moral evil consists in a 
disorder of loves corresponds to Aquinas’ later development. But Augustine does not 
specify sin’s precise origin in the human will.   
                                                          
36
 ST I-II, q. 75, a. 1, ad 3, trans. Friars of the English Dominican Province (Westminster, MD: Christian 
Classics, 1948, 1981), vol. 2, 928. 
37
 Augustine of Hippo, On Free Choice of the Will, trans. Thomas Williams (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1993), 3. 
Aquinas’ doctrine describes a metaphysical moment of the human will that 
ontologically precedes an act of choice. In this metaphysical moment, one’s will is posed 
with the choice to adhere to its proper rule or to decline to do so. Aquinas specifies 
what the will declines: “. . .the will in failing to apply the rule of reason or of the Divine 
law, is the cause of sin.”
38
  As the will proceeds to act, the intellect adverts to God’s 
guidance in revelation or right reason and determines to act in accord with that order or 
not. 
Aquinas describes this moment as “pre-existing” in the moral agent: “. . . evil 
never follows in the effect, unless some other evil pre-exists in the agent or in the 
matter. . .”
39
 This pre-existing evil in the agent is a negation and deficiency in the will, 
and not yet a privation of a due good in an act. The will’s negation is that of an 
interruption of the order which governs the person’s good and the role of the appetible 
good in it. Here, the will has not yet committed to intending an end through a chosen 
moral object. Between mere willing (simplex voluntas) and the choice (electio) of means 
to one’s end, there is a profoundly complex ontological process involving interplay 
between the will and intellect. And yet, the aspects of this unified process can be 
investigated, provided the parts are not mistaken for discrete acts.  
In any moral act, the intellect is presented with an appetible good. Attaining that 
intended good and the means to it require the intellect’s reasoning and the will’s 
                                                          
38
 “. . .voluntas sine adhibitione regulae rationis vel legis divinae, est causa peccati,” ST I-II, q. 75, a. 1, ad 3, 
(Turin: Marietti, 1950), 347. trans. Friars of the English Dominican Province, (Westminster, MD: Christian 
Classics, 1948, 1981), vol. 2, 928.  
39
 “nunquam sequitur malum in effectu, nisi praeexistat aliquod aliud malum in agente vel materia. . .” (ST 
I, q. 49, a. 1, ad 3), (Turin: Marietti, 1950), 249. trans. Friars of the English Dominican Province, vol. 1, 254. 
movement. The first ontological, and not chronological, moment is for Aquinas the 
openness or closedness to divine guidance.
40
 Maritain rightly takes this moment to be a 
condition of metaphysical freedom.
41
 Why is this moment metaphysically required? 
When one proceeds to a choice of means, one needs to be guided by something. 
Maritain points out that Aquinas holds that God has the first initiative of any good act.
42
 
This guidance is either the order of reality as established and revealed by God or it is 
not. Maritain argues that “This moment of non-consideration of the rule is so to speak 
the spiritual element of sin.”
43
 
It is not supposed that the moral agent consciously brings to mind this rule in 
every act. Maritain observes that “the faultiness of the will does not consist in not 
paying attention in act to the rule of reason or of divine law, but in this: --that without 
taking heed of the rule it proceeds to the act of choice.”
44
 Thus, the habitual sinner, 
having once refused to obey its rule, would presumably have a virtual intention of 
continuing to neglect it, without being conscious of this neglect in subsequent acts.
45
 At 
the same time, studied ignorance or culpable negligence of a particular moral rule 
would be conscious departures from the divinely-established order. Each aspect of the 
process of moral action is helped by a relevant virtue, thus Aquinas sees the virtue of 
truthfulness (veritas) as critical to the habitus of truth-telling. 
                                                          
40
 By implication of n. 38 supra. 
41
 Jacques Maritain, St. Thomas and the Problem of Evil (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 
1942), 27. 
42
 Ibid., 37. 
43
 Ibid., 32. 
44
 Ibid., 28. 
45
 Austin Fagothey, S.J., describes the virtual intention as one that was “once made and continues to 
influence the act now being done, but is not present to the person’s consciousness at the moment of 
performing the act” Right and Reason, 2
nd
 ed. (Rockford, IL: Tan Books, 2000), 99. 
Although the will is ultimately responsible for turning away from divine wisdom 
and right reason, it may be occasioned by other internal causes, or by external causes 
through internal causes. Aquinas states:  
Now, as state above, none can move the will inwardly save God alone, who 
cannot be a cause of sin. . . . Hence it follows that nothing external can be a 
cause of sin, except by moving the reason, as a man or devil by enticing to sin; or 
by moving the sensitive appetite, as certain external sensibles move it.
46
  
Thus, Aquinas maintains that the will is fundamental to sinning, though it 
depends on the intellect’s presentation of an illicit good to the will. But he allows that 
the good desired in sinning may be occasioned by ignorance of the intellect, or a 
disordered passion or weakness of the appetites. 
II. The ens reale/ens rationis distinction 
While elaborating Aquinas’ explanation for the origin of moral evil, Maritain 
makes a telling statement that moves the ethical discussion into the metaphysical. He 
notes that in introducing the non-consideration of its rule, the will “has introduced the 
condition which will cause the texture of being to give way. . .such an act will bear in 
itself the teeth-marks of nothingness.”
47
 This remark about damage to the texture of 
being recalls Maritain’s concern with the empirical sciences in his day and his desire to 
renew the philosophy of nature. 
                                                          
46
 “Voluntatem autem, ut supra dictum est, interius movere non potest nisi Deus; qui non potest esse 
causa peccati. . .. Unde relinquitur quod nihil exterius potest esse causa peccati, nisi vel inquantum movet 
rationem, sicut homo vel daemon persuadens peccatum; vel sicut movens appetitum sensitivum, sicut 
aliqua sensibilia exteriora movent appetitum sensitivum” Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 75, a. 3 (Turin: 
Marietti, 1950), 349. English: vol. 2, 928. 
47
 Jacques Maritain, St. Thomas and the Problem of Evil, 33. 
 The decision to forego reference to the philosophy of nature, and hence of the 
empirically real, is analogous to the will’s departure from its proper rule before it 
proceeds to act. There is nothing yet sinful in such an abstraction, cf. mathematical 
abstractions, provided one does not proceed to act as though the abstraction suffices 
for reality itself. Considering something solely as an ens rationis is not yet 
metaphysically culpable, but it does lack the full reality of the real being, through which 
it has any reality. Idealistic physical science is not then on this analogy akin to nihilism, 
but it is critically severed from real being. 
 Maritain discusses the real relation and distinction between a thought and its 
object. He points out that adequation in Thomistic epistemology has nothing to do “with 
a copy or material transfer.” Adequation is between the being of a thing and the “being 
affirmed by the mind” in the act of judgment.
48
 Maritain holds that Descartes' mistake 
was taking the object to be in thought, and “not as an intelligible entity rendered 
present to the mind through an immaterial form.”
49
 In reality, the object retains its 
integral nature in the world, while the knower may have a concept that has an 
ontological relation to it. The Cartesian mistake of subsuming the real object by the 
object known eviscerates the object's nature. Beings of reason in the mind need be 
referred to real objects to be conceived adequately. Without such a reference real 
beings are made beings of reason, when one divorces the relation of reason (ratio) from 
the object's integral nature. 
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 This relation of knowing can be seen also in the moral object. Steven A. Long 
shows that within the moral object there is the relation of reason (ratio), which makes 
an act choiceworthy, and the act itself in its integral nature.
50
 Here ontological 
adequation can be thought of between the attractive aspect of the moral object and its 
integral nature. Applied to truth-telling, one can distinguish a verbal construal of the 
state of affairs, the intellectual grasp of the state of affairs being verbally construed, and 
the state of affairs itself. Though the state of affairs itself has its real being in reality and 
is the ultimate reference to reality for the verbal and intellectual construals, it is clear 
that the latter two referents each admit of “inadequation,” deliberate or not, 
commensurate to the agent's intellectual and linguistic abilities.
51
 That is, one can 
choose to characterize a state of affairs in a multitude of ways, as one conceives specific 
aspects of a relevant concept in contrast to others, and further asserts that concept in a 
selective way. 
III. The relation of word-ratio-thing 
Having surveyed St. Thomas’ thought on the origin of moral evil and Maritain’s 
exposition on an analogous metaphysical sin, we can detect its implications in language 
by looking at the metaphysical elements of an assertion. Aquinas makes this connection 
in his “Treatise on the Angels” in the Summa Theologiae. In reply to the objection that 
demons are perverse because of falsehood in the intellect, St. Thomas replies that their 
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perversity is instead in not being subject to divine wisdom.
52
 Analogously, when the 
human intellect is not subject to the divine order and will, it enters into error. 
Ordinarily, an assertion is represented by a combination of signs or words, which 
refer to rationes/concepts, through which a thing (res) or state of affairs is known.
53
 
One’s judgment of a thing’s real existence and what it actually is present the condition 
for error. That is, we may misidentify an object. The use of speech adds another 
occasion for error in that an assertion may refer more or less to a concept in its linguistic 
context. But again, an assertion need have some relation to a concept, else mistaken 
terms for concepts would be impossible, e.g., when one errs in speaking a foreign 
language. The relation of a being and its thought has an ontological basis, while 
thoughts and speech have only a conventional relation. This means that assertions have 
two real relations—to the real beings that are signified and to their signification in a 
linguistic context. 
Applied to truth-telling, one can distinguish a verbal construal of the state of 
affairs, the intellectual grasp of the state of affairs being verbally construed, and the 
state of affairs itself. The state of affairs itself has its being in reality and is the ultimate 
reference for the verbal and intellectual construals. And it is clear that the latter two 
admit of “inadequation,” deliberate or not, depending upon the agent's intellectual and 
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linguistic abilities.
54
 That is, one can choose to characterize a state of affairs in a 
multitude of ways, as one conceives specific aspects of a relevant ratio/concept in 
contrast to others and asserts that selected aspect. 
The derangement of a verbal construal of the ratio, or concept relevant to a 
state of affairs, is difficult to assess. Besides the many rationes relevant to states of 
affairs, the relation of an assertion to its rationes involves manifold contextual elements, 
including the assertion's meaning in the language itself, in its present circumstances, 
and its asymmetrical sense in the mind of the speaker versus the hearer. But again, 
some common reference must be possible, else successful communication would not be 
possible. And although the linguistic order is only conventionally related to the rationes 
through which things are known, this order becomes normative when one proceeds to 
speak. That is, the social nature of language establishes inter-subjective norms of 
vocabulary, syntax, and grammar, respective of places, times, and cultures.   
IV. Contra mentem as the lie’s definition 
Having seen the ontological elements of an assertion, the grounds for 
Augustine’s and Aquinas’ notion that the lie is an intentional speaking of something 
contra mentem are evident. The lie begins in the intellect’s presentation of a difficult 
good to the will. Intending this good and deliberating about means to it, the intellect 
discovers an insuperable or at least significant obstacle to attaining it through truthful 
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communication.
55
 In lying, the truthful order of reality is itself the obstacle to the will’s 
end. The appetible good, known through a phantasm, is typically known by 
complementary aspects. The context of communication delimits the relevant aspects of 
rationes involved. A lie assumes a false ratio, or aspect thereof, that presents itself as 
contra mentem namely of the truthful mental ratio. The lie begins in the false judgment 
of the thing and a ratio. When one knowingly proceeds to assert this false judgment in 
pursuit of a difficult good, one lies.
56
 It is the choice of a false assertion and proceeding 
to assert it that satisfies the definition of the lie. The reason for its essential evil involves 
something more.   
A lie is typified by its compositeness and its analogous, hylomorphic structure. It 
is composite because it is used as a means to another end, except in the case of the 
pathological liar.
57
 Its hylomorphic structure is seen in St. Thomas’ relation of an 
instrumental act to an intrinsic end. He writes that "one sin is also the formal cause of 
another: because in the act of fornication committed for the purpose of theft, the 
former is material while the latter is formal."
58
 In this way, we can see how the lie is 
related to the difficult good sought. At the same time, the lie itself must have a 
form/matter structure, as the agent's intention is formal to the matter of the assertion 
chosen. He writes in the same article of the Summa: "A sin has matter, not of which but 
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about which it is, and it has its form from its end.”
59
 From this we can see that the lie 
has an intelligible form/matter structure, and may be per se evil even if the end sought 
is otherwise good. 
Aquinas elaborates on this as follows: “Now a lie is evil in respect of its genus, 
since it is an action bearing on undue matter. For, as words are naturally signs of 
intellectual acts, it is unnatural and undue for anyone to signify by words something that 
is not in his mind.”
60
 From the doctrine of the origin of moral evil described above, we 
can see that choosing the unnatural and undue assertion is preceded by the choice of a 
ratio or aspect of it that is inadequate to the context. The undue assertion must 
presuppose a deranged ratio, deranged from the true order of reality, else the assertion 
would be rejected as incompatible with the lying intention. A lie is thus contra mentem, 
and its evil derives from having departed from the ontological norm. The evil is in 
choosing a false ratio against the true one held in mind for the purpose of assertion, and 
this presumes that the reality of the true ratio has been negated.   
Joseph Boyle says that for Aquinas what is undue is an assertion’s voluntary 
falsity, and the matter is the mere assertion.
61
 But for Aquinas, the assertion itself has 
its ratio and a form/matter structure. The matter of the assertion is its propositional 
content and its form is its ratio, or intelligible structure, which specifies its ends. That is, 
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each intelligible assertion is choiceworthy on the basis of which ends it is apt to be 
directed to by the will. Thus, the matter of the moral object (finis operis) cannot simply 
be assimilated into the agent’s intention (finis operantis). The agent’s intention 
references the intentions of the act, and their correspondence determines the 
fittingness of the particular act. To fall on undue matter is to will a false ratio that has 
been dislodged from its proper order so as to deceive. That is, one can imagine words 
that will serve one’s purpose, but they may be lying words in a certain context. This 
would make them undue matter. The will’s departure from its rule is formal to the 
matter of the deranged concept. Intending the difficult good, the will then intends that 
good through the matter of the concept.   
Apart from this, the assertion itself is ordered or not to a plan to attain that good 
within its context. When the person intent on lying unwittingly speaks a true statement, 
the intent alone deranges the matter. In this case, the assertion involves both an 
intentional and unintentional derangement from the order of reality. The speaker 
intentionally deranges the known ratio from its true place in the order of reality, but 
then through a misapprehension of that reality unintentionally asserts something in 
accord with it. And such a true statement, coinciding with ontological and linguistic 
orders, will be less likely to have deleterious consequences. But the agent has still lied, 
even though he has not successfully chosen a lying assertion. 
 This case of a lie with no adverse consequences explains why Aquinas states that 
“neither does any effect belong to the species of its cause.”
62
 The evil of the lie is found 
in an analysis of the moral object, and not essentially in its effects. For this reason, 
Germain Grisez’s account of the lie’s evil consisting in its direct opposition to the basic 
goods of self-integration, authenticity and solidarity in the community misses the 
mark.
63
 A lie’s effect on basic goods is inessential to the evil of the lie. This is not to say 
that more ultimate evil intentions of the agent and accidents like scandal may not 
increase the gravity of a lie’s evil.
64
 The definition of a lie is that it is essentially speaking 
an assertion contra mentem, but its evil is found in the will’s intentional departure from 
the normative order of reality in pursuit of a difficult good, fashioning creation 
according to the agent’s own lights. 
 Within this context, one can see what deliberately concealed speech like 
euphemisms involves. In euphemistic assertion, one chooses an assertion related to a 
ratio that adequately conveys the relevant concept, though without the potentially 
problematic associations that another assertion might carry. This is different from 
equivocal communication, where one chooses an assertion which does not adequately 
convey the sense of the relevant concept as it is determined by context and usage.  
V. Conclusion 
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 In this chapter, I have considered Aquinas’ doctrine on the origin of moral evil. 
Aquinas sees a metaphysical moment of the will’s departure from its proper rule as first 
condition for a morally evil act. The will’s movement away from the order of being is 
analogous to a confusion in metaphysics between beings of reason and real beings that 
Maritain and Yves Simon challenged in their renewal of the philosophy of nature. 
Further, it was shown that assertoric speech involves the triadic structure of word-ratio-
res, which is normative for truth-telling. The intentional dimensions of Aquinas’ and 
Augustine’s definition of a lie as essentially speaking an assertion contra mentem were 
shown. And it was shown that the lie’s evil stems from the agent’s choice of consciously 
false concepts, departing from the normative order of reality so as to obtain a difficult 
good, fashioning creation in one’s own image. And although we can surely trust in God’s 
mercy and forgiveness after we confess when we lie, and are called to extend that 
mercy to those who lie to us, a precise notion of the evil of the lie helps prevent 
presumption of that mercy, and enables us to better live in the truth. 
Chapter 3: Lying’s Definition and the Limits of Lying 
 Having shown why lying is per se evil, it is fitting to consider its definition. And in 
this process, we will delineate speech that is licit, but near lying. The problem of the 
definition of near lies has received little attention. And this neglect is curious, as in 
practice “white lies” and subtle deceptions are given greater defense and justification 
than blatant lies. This chapter presumes that a lie is morally significant, and that it 
involves voluntarily asserting as true what one knows to be false, or vice versa, with the 
customary contextual qualifiers. It considers assertions that are at the limit of lying, and 
how such are delineated as lies or non-lies by their intentional structure. Consider this 
exchange: 
 “You lied to me.”  
“No, I didn’t. What I said was true in a sense.”  
 This kind of conversation points to the problem of near lying, where disputed 
interpretations of assertions can leave each person convinced that he is right and that 
the other is either a liar or unsophisticated in his interpretation. Such slight misleadings 
and insincere remarks are often taken to be the heart of tactfulness. They are the typical 
means of escaping regretted promises.  And perhaps their sheer constancy in daily life is 
enough to give up hope that they could be reined in. Ought they to be?  
 In this chapter, I will give an account of the limits of near lying in the case of two 
types of near lies: broad and strict mental reservations. I will specify the intentional 
dimension of a traditional definition of lying, i.e., “speaking contrary to one’s mind.” By 
employing Jacques Maritain's account of knowing in the Degrees of Knowledge, I will 
propose an intentional, mental difference in the speech acts employed in strict and 
broad reservations. And I will show how double-effect reasoning resolves the 
permissibility of two types of near lies. 
 An older, casuist tradition has identified strict and broad mental reservations, 
meaning reservations of the full scope of one’s knowledge about a matter in speech. 
Thus, one may speak an assertion which reveals the truth of a matter partially, while 
reserving what would make it a full and obvious disclosure. This domain of subtle 
speech includes amphiboly, implications, and diversions. Just as these manners of 
speaking are fashioned by the speaker according to their expected reception, the 
speaker formulates the strict or broad reservation according to what he judges the 
hearer to be capable of understanding, or deserving to know. But in this type of speech, 
the hearer’s difficulty in understanding an assertion is not viewed as a potential obstacle 
to communication, but presents an opportunity that guides the speaker’s choice of an 
assertion. The judgment of whether the hearer deserves to know the information 
originally prompts the speaker to consider the use of subtilizing speech. 
I. Lying’s Contexts 
 Linguistic context significantly delimits the range of possible meanings of 
particular words and assertions, e.g., the relevant sense of homophones is normally 
unproblematic in practice. But there remains in everyday conversation amphibolous and 
ambiguous terms with which one can conceal one’s meaning. Linguistic contexts are 
formed by speakers’ prevailing presumptions of what may be said under the 
circumstances.
65
 For example, Augustine considers the case of a skeptical friend, who 
assumes that the speaker is always lying. If the speaker wishes to communicate a truth 
to the friend, the speaker has to say the opposite of what he means. Here the speaker is 
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duplicitous, but has no intention to deceive.
66
 Augustine does not consider this a lie, 
since it does not include an intention to deceive. And Aquinas would also likely not 
consider this lying, since the speaker and friend understand each other, albeit through 
an elaborate language game.   
 In addition to the linguistic context, lying requires reference to the act’s moral 
context. While a traditional argument for the wrongness of lying is that it erodes mutual 
trust in society, certain lying problems presuppose that mutual trust is fundamentally 
lacking. Benedict Guevin, O.S.B., maintains that in the context of a Nazi interrogating 
someone who is hiding Jews, human speech is not occurring.
67
 Thus, a pre-condition for 
lying is not fulfilled, and the innocent person can intentional speak falsely (falsiloquium) 
without lying. It seems undeniable that the application of force or other modifiers of 
voluntariness at least have bearing on a lie’s culpability.  
 The moral status of lying also depends on one’s presuppositions about speech. 
Aquinas considers lying in the context of the virtue of veracity, which is a part of 
justice.
68
 This virtue imposes a moral debt on the agent, “to present truthful speech to 
his neighbor.”
69
 Augustine’s position is even more contextualized by Christian beliefs, 
holding that lying shatters the image of the Triune God in which we are made.
70
 It is 
thus understood that speech involves linguistic and moral contexts. These often have 
                                                          
66
 Augustine, De Mendacio 4.4, trans. Carlo Carena et al., Sant’Agostino: Morale e Ascetismo Cristiano, 
Opere di Sant’Agostino 7/2 (Rome: Citta Nuova Editrice, 2001), 314-8. Cited in Paul J. Griffiths, Lying: An 
Augustinian Theology of Duplicity, 28. 
67
 Benedict M. Guevin, O.S.B., “When a Lie is Not a Lie: The Importance of Ethical Context,” Thomist 66 
(2002): 273. 
68
 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 109-13. 
69
 Julius A. Dorszynski, 82. 
70
 Paul J. Griffiths, 17. 
crucial bearing on an assertion’s truth-value. Guevin’s arguments about lying’s contexts 
bear on a lie’s culpability. However, it is difficult to see how the duty to speak the truth 
is not only negated, requiring silence, but inverted, allowing performative contradictions 
to this duty. 
II. Identifying Near Lies 
 There is ample perennial and current literature on the questions of the 
wrongness, types, and degrees of gravity of lies. In addition, whether a lie should be 
prohibited without exception, or tolerated in exceptional cases continues to be 
debated.
71
 The question of what a lie violates, e.g., a semantic breach, rationality, 
hearer’s rights,
72
 relates to distinguishing the types of near lying. As the previous 
chapter showed, I do assume Augustine and Aquinas’ position that a lie is inherently 
wrong, and that its wrongness can be found in the speaker without regard to the 
hearer’s rights. The hearer’s rights argument has much to commend it, and I believe 
that the discussion below is also relevant to that position, since it delineates degrees of 
force in deceptive speech. I will write about assertions to distinguish mental 
reservations and lying.
73
 And what I argue about near lying in assertions will largely be 
true for other forms of truth-relevant communication. Presuming the evil of lying, it is of 
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benefit to consider assertions that are at its limit, and how such are delineated as lies or 
non-lies by their intentional structure. 
 In the consideration of the morality of an act, Aquinas first considers the object 
of the act, or the act itself. One may consider that a speech act’s object is represented in 
a word or more extended expression, referring to a concept, which in turn typically 
represents a real object or state of affairs.
74
 The relation between a being’s real 
existence and its thought present the condition for error. There is a unity in reality 
between the thought or concept of the thing and the thing itself, else error would be 
impossible. We may add that the speech act presents another occasion for error in that 
an assertion may refer more or less to a concept in its context. But again, an assertion 
need have some relation to a concept, else mistaken terms for concepts, e.g., seen 
particularly when one errs in speaking a foreign language, would be impossible. The 
relation of a being and its thought has an objective basis grounded in reality, while 
thoughts and speech have only a conventional relation. I present this sketch of the 
being-thought-language relation without pretending that this is a simple problem. I 
maintain only that there is a relation that is not ultimately inscrutable.    
The derangement of a verbal construal of the ratio, as discussed in the last 
chapter, is profoundly difficult to assess. Besides the typical multiplication of concepts 
involved in the characterization of a state of affairs, the relation of a speech act to its 
referent involves manifold contextual elements, including the speech act's meaning in 
the language itself, in its present context, and in its asymmetrical sense in the mind of 
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But he gives these too much weight and ends in inappropriately deranging the speech 
act from its referents. 
 In his article, “Lying and Speaking Your Interlocutor’s Language,” Pruss points out 
that the use of a language involves anticipating the hearer's understanding of the terms 
that one uses. He thus adverts to the Nazi at the door who demands to know if one is 
hiding Jews. When the Nazi asks if one has Jews, one can expect that by “Jew” the Nazi 
means a disease, or subhuman form of life. Anticipating the Nazi’s understanding, the 
one who is hiding Jews, believing them to be human beings, can truthfully reply, “No, I 
am not hiding Jews.” Pruss is at least consistent in saying that to answer “Yes,” to the 
Nazi would thereby be a lie. This solution has two problems. It is at least clear that the 
person hiding the Jews has deranged the speech act from the relevant reference in this 
context. To admit this does not dignify the Nazi's possible understanding, but merely 
acknowledges that the speech act refers to the really existing Jews, albeit through an 
inadequate concept. If the Jews were beings of reason, Pruss' solution might stand. But 
their real being excludes the idealization this subterfuge requires. Pruss' solution fails on 
a second count as it is a signal example of the strict reservation, which I will show to be 
tantamount to a lie on intentional grounds. But first, there is need to define the act of 
lying. 
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III. Definition of a lie in general 
 Though the speech act is the basis of the moral act of truth-telling, it requires 
further specification in terms of the end or intention of the speaker. This is obvious in 
view of the fact that speaking a falsehood alone does not amount to a lie, as one might 
inculpably speak a falsehood that one thought was true. One might also employ words 
that are materially true, but intend to lie with them. The classical casuist John Rickaby, 
S.J., holds that the speaker’s assertion alone is of no moral consequence, as all depends 
on the speaker’s intention. He defines a lie as an assertion spoken which is at odds with 
what one has in mind.
76
 Thus, a lie can be spoken where the assertion is in fact true, 
unbeknownst to the speaker. The “contrary to one’s mind” definition requires 
elaboration. 
 Experienced speakers of a language tend to be aware of the multiple meanings 
of terms. That a term connotes a broader range of meanings than one normally intends 
does not normally paralyze a speaker, who foresees that he might be misunderstood. 
Because the connotation of terms cannot be tailored to one’s intended sense in an 
assertion, it shows that speaking partially “contrary to one’s mind” is often inevitable. 
Language is an imperfect bearer of thought. In this way, Rickaby's definition is too 
broad, and would have one lying most of the time.  
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In another way, the definition is too narrow. One could employ the strictest of 
mental reservations in a speech act, and maintain that there is a tenuous relation 
between the sense he understood and the assertion. Therefore, there is no disparity 
between his mind and speech to qualify as a lie. Clearly, the intentional dimension of a 
lie or near lie need be specified more precisely than the definition of speaking contrary 
to one’s mind.  
IV. Intentional structure of mental reservations 
 In an assertion the speaker expresses an opinion that the hearer believes him to 
maintain truthfully. In intending remotely to persuade, or apprise the hearer of 
information, the speaker chooses proximately the appropriate words for this remote 
end. Being thirsty, the speaker may say, “I’m thirsty,” intending to convey a need to the 
hearer. The speaker expects that these words will produce a characteristic disposition in 
the hearer. The speaker may thus further intend the effect of the hearer’s getting her a 
glass of water. In all, the speaker chooses the words that are the means to the 
informing, the act of informing itself, and intends the desired effect which follows from 
them.  
 Moral analysis of an assertion of propositions itself is inconclusive without 
reference to the intention or purpose for which it was used. If an intention can be seen 
to guide the choice of one’s words in view of one’s intended goal and foreseen effects, 
then it would seem to be here that a lie or near lie is conceived. The intentional process 
would then be roughly as follows:  
1. One intends a certain goal or end.  
2. One sees that the goal is difficult enough so as to require the choice of a concealed or 
deceptive means.
77
  
3. One’s intention guides the choice of an assertion that reserves or obscures the truth 
of one’s intention from a small to a complete degree, foreseeing expected 
interpretations of its sense. 
 The intended and solely foreseen interpretations of one’s assertion guide the 
intention in its formation of an assertion. I assume that there is a distinction between 
the intended and solely foreseen, and that this marks a morally significant difference.
78
 
One may be responsible for foreseen effects of one’s speech acts, but this need not be 
the case. If this distinction is not meaningful, then one would be responsible for all 
foreseen misinterpretations of one’s speech. Then a speaker would need to be 
constantly annotating his speech to clarify his sense. Since this task would use speech, it 
would engender more terms to clarify. One would be left continually clarifying against 
possible misinterpretations, and unable to move forward with speech. Instead, we 
confidently use terms with multiple meanings and leave clarifications for when a 
misinterpretation occurs. 
 The intended and solely foreseen distinction seems to be dispensable in obvious 
truth-telling or lying. If our person hiding the Jews were to reply, “Yes, I am hiding Jews,” 
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the foreseen interpretation would seem to follow readily from the intended sense. But 
it should be said that the speaker who answers affirmatively may intend to speak 
truthfully without intending to betray his hidden Jews. This may be a foreseen effect of 
one's assertion, but it does not follow that the speaker intends this. This is a distinction 
about moral agency. But since the agent foresees a disastrous effect of his plain truth-
telling, he might consider employing some degree of reservation of his intention. The 
complete mental reservation of one’s thought and intentional speaking of a falsehood, 
would be a lie. 
 The plain lie response, “No, I have no Jews,” when one knows that one has Jews 
on the premises, would presumably lead to an interpretation at odds with what the 
speaker knows. It could lead to the consequence of the hiding Jews being spared. But 
those who regard a lie as morally wrong under any circumstances would want to avoid 
this option if possible. A desire to avoid the plain lie if possible or absolutely, but also to 
avoid the foreseen consequence of the Jews being apprehended, would lead the 
speaker to choose words that partially reserve his intention.  Having identified the clear 
lie and the plainly true assertion, we can consider speech that employs mental 
reservations and examine its intentional structures.  
 One could imagine replying to the Nazi's question, “Do you have any Jews in 
there?” With: “I have no Jews,” construing “have” as “in my personal possession,” or “in 
my pocket.”
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have Jews. Also, one could reply, “Juice?  I hate juice.  I would never have any in the 
house.”  The first statement equivocates on the sense of a term, while the other 
substitutes a decoy term, and thus modifies the object rather than the intention.  I will 
argue that both of these responses employ strict mental reservations and are 
tantamount to lies. 
 As was stated above, the use of strict mental reservations involves speech acts 
whose meaning is strictly reserved to the speaker because it is removed from the 
context, thus making the hearer’s ability to interpret the statement correctly nearly 
impossible. A strict reservation can be identified by its inherent, intentional structure. 
One who uses a strict reservation foresees at least two interpretations, e.g., an 
admission of having Jews, and a denial of this. Should the person communicate that he 
has Jews (in his pocket), which he does not believe, he would have spoken a falsehood. 
His not having Jews in his pocket is at least something he believes to be true. He 
foresees both of these interpretations or effects of his assertion. He intends the Nazi to 
take him to be denying that he is hiding Jews, and foresees but does not intend that the 
Nazi intuit the special sense of “have” meant in his statement, which would intimate 
that they are had in another manner. Why is this?  
 By the “denial of Jews on the premises” interpretation, the person hopes to 
spare the potential victims. The “admission of Jews on the premises” sense is thus 
concealed by a strict mental reservation. It can be called strict because the hearer’s 
likelihood of interpreting the assertion in the true sense is so narrow as to be 
impossible. The only relation of the statement to a true sense is one wholly irrelevant to 
the context. This is a lie because though it aims at a reasonable end, and says words that 
are materially true in a sense, it is by means of conveying a sense known to be false as 
true that the protector seeks his goal. This is intentionally speaking contra mentem, 
which makes it a lie.  
The speaker intends the Nazi to interpret the expression falsely and does not 
solely foresee it. This therefore is the morally relevant intention of the act, and it is an 
intention that depends upon a sense of the statement that is contra mentem. He may 
bear a true sense of the statement in mind while speaking, e.g., “no Jews in the pocket,” 
but he expressly does not intend that this interpretation be understood. The true 
interpretation may be foreseen as a scenario in which his plan backfires, but this worry 
does not inform the act so as to make his intended interpretation true. 
V. Strict versus broad mental reservations 
 In a consequentialist view, mental reservations can be seen as lies because all 
aim at deception. But the intention to deceive cannot be a part of the definition of lying. 
This is because otherwise lawful acts can include an intention to deceive. Catholic 
moralists have not seen broad mental reservations as illicit, e.g., diversions, etc. And the 
effect of being deceived is different from that of being lied to. This can be seen in the 
case of playing a gambit in chess, versus stealing the opponent’s pieces when he is not 
looking. One may be harmed in a sense by deception, but this is different from the harm 
of a lie. 
 Is one then left only to lie or tell the blunt truth? I would now like to suggest that 
a broad reservation may be admissible. Instead of meeting the question directly, the 
person opts for an expression with more indefinite interpretive prospects. He replies, 
“Hiding Jews would be quite a nuisance,” or “Wouldn't hiding Jews be a great crime?” 
These diversionary responses no doubt have poorer prospects for warding off the unjust 
aggressor. However, they are certainly not lies, and may repel the unjust aggressor, 
especially if the speaker appears to be cooperating. 
 The broad reservation differs from a strict reservation in its inherent, intentional 
structure. That is, it is a type of speech act that has an inherent tendency different from 
strict mental reservations. The broad mental reservation’s banality admits of many 
interpretations. One may foresee that the Nazi will interpret the statement to mean 
that there are no Jews on the premises. One may hope that the Nazi takes this 
interpretation. But by choosing this assertion with its distinctive intentional structure, 
the speaker manifests that he does not assert a false sense. He communicates a truth 
ably through this assertion, and intends its vague truth.  
The broad reservation includes an intention to deceive the hearer. But the 
speaker does not intend his goal through intending that a false interpretation be given 
to his statement. Though he fears the consequences of the interpretation that he is 
diverting or merely temporizing, he gives a statement open to this interpretation. Thus, 
he intends to respond to the question truthfully, but leaves the hearer to make an 
erroneous interpretation. The critical difference between the broad reservation and the 
strict reservation is that the broad reservation is based on an assertion, whose meaning 
is fixed by the conversation’s context, which is sicut mentem of the speaker. 
Alternatively, a strict reservation is contra mentem of the speaker, because the relevant 
sense of the locution, fixed by the context, is contrary to his mind.  
 It may seem strange to speak of the broad reservation as an intentional 
communication of a true interpretation, when one obscures it by using terms that admit 
of other possible interpretations. But one can intend clandestinely, just as one intends 
timidly, boldly, etc. The broad reservation obscures an intention by crowding the true 
interpretation with other possible interpretations. It does not however slant towards a 
false interpretation. This is characteristic of the strict reservation. Such slanting towards 
a specific, false interpretation can happen in many ways. Athanasius was pursued by 
those who wanted to kill him but did not know his face. They asked, “Have you seen 
Athanansius?” He replied “He is not far.” This would arguably be a broad reservation. 
But Athanasius pointed his finger in another direction, and his broad reservation 
became strict. 
 Jonathan E. Adler points out an important difference between the speaker and 
hearer in the cases of lying and lawful deception. The strict reservation and lie typically 
employ the speaker’s inferences and leave little for the hearer to determine. 
Alternatively, merely implying or deceiving leave the hearer to make the significant 
inferences.
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to blame for having made such inferences, and does not regard the speaker to be wholly 
at fault.   
Even if a strict reservation or lie were justified under some circumstances, it is 
morally advantageous to be aware of the less forceful means of repelling an unjust 
aggressor, if one accepts the principle moderamen inculpatae tutelae, i.e., “one must 
use only that amount of force that suffices to repel effectively the unjust aggressor.”
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These might be ranked from the least forceful to the most as: silence, evasion, broad 
reservations, and only then untruths. 
 Why would one prefer the strict reservation to a less forceful means? We can 
see that the person's prospects for frustrating the Nazi's course are improved by its use. 
The assertion, “I have no Jews,” leads the hearer to a sense that is contra mentem of the 
speaker, and greatly minimizes the prospects of the hearer determining the “true” 
interpretation. And in general, we can see that a strict reservation is a reasonable 
temptation, as its permits more means to one’s end, allowing one to express one’s 
intention in more disguised and favorable terms. But the strict reservation opens these 
possibilities only by manipulating others’ expectations, and teaching hearers to doubt 
one’s words.
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This can also be said about broad reservations to a more limited extent. Adler 
points out that deception [e.g., strict reservations] can be a greater moral and social 
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threat than even lying, because the deceiver cannot be caught red-handed, as a liar can 
be once his lie is discovered.
83
 It can be argued that broad mental reservations are 
likewise problematic because they often do not come to mind in time, or are detected 
by a sharp listener, or are impossible for an unlearned person.
84
 This is true, but when a 
social threat like Nazism arises, teachers can identify amphibolies and broad 
reservations for replies to predictable questions, and teach them to the less learned.  
V. Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have offered an argument about the limits of near lying based 
on the intentional structure of two types of near lies. This account gives grounds for why 
a strict reservation should be considered a lie, and why a broad reservation should not 
be. Instead of relying on intuitive examples about their difference, I have shown that 
they incorporate different intentional structures. This account offers greater precision 
over previous treatments of near lying. At the same time, it acknowledges the 
complexity of our intentions and expectations of the effects of assertions. This account 
makes sense of why promise-breaking or lying defended on the grounds that what one 
said was “true in a sense,” evades the meanings of words and the confidences of those 
who depend on them.  
Thesis conclusion 
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 In this thesis, we have examined Paul Griffith’s retrieval of St. Augustine’s 
thinking about lying. I offered some criticisms of his treatment, and suggested that St. 
Thomas Aquinas offers a more compelling account on the issue. I surveyed a critical 
historical period where the distinctions on types of deceptive speech were delineated. I 
noted that this period concluded with papal condemnations of lying and the use of strict 
mental reservations. This data from the tradition should inform Catholic moral theology 
when approaching the problem of lying. 
 In the second chapter, I gave a brief exposition of Aquinas’ thought on the 
relationship between thought, reality and speech. I argued that reality and language 
impose rules on what may truthfully be said or thought. A moral agent can think and will 
contrary to these rules, but only by sacrificing the truth.  
 In the third chapter, I re-examined the definition of a lie as speech that is contra 
mentem of the speaker. I argued that this is ultimately the correct definition of lying, 
and that deception, though it is a normal consequence of lying, is not part of its 
definition. I then considered two types of near lies: speech employing strict and broad 
mental reservations. I argued that strict mental reservations are ultimately speaking 
contra mentem, since the sense that is relevant to the context is contrary to what the 
speaker knows. Alternatively, broad mental reservations rely on ambiguous assertions 
whose sense in the linguistic context agrees with what the speaker knows, although the 
hearer may have difficulty discerning it.  
 In conclusion, the Church may be entering into an age where the temptations to 
sacrifice the truth for the sake of protecting property, and even life become great. But 
the Catholic moral tradition should continue to inform the Church about the 
responsibility to remain faithful to the truth unto death, for Jesus said, “I am the way 
and the truth and the life” (John 14:6).  
